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2021-05-04
< michaelfolkson>
hugohn: I personally think it would be overkill to give the BIPs repo its own org
< michaelfolkson>
hugohn: They aren't really bundled with the Core project. It is true the BIPs repo is under the Bitcoin Core GitHub org but no Bitcoin Core maintainers merge BIP PRs afaik so I think it is fine under the Core org
< michaelfolkson>
I think there will be future discussions on a revised BIP process once (hopefully) Taproot activation is completed hugohn if you'd like to engage with that https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/1015
< wumpus>
in any case, this discussion is kind of off-topic here, the bitcoin core project is one implementation, that the current BIPs repository is in the same orginazation is a historical artifact, it does not mean BIPs 'belong' to bitcoin core or something like that
< wumpus>
you mean like BIP1 and 2?
< hugohn>
right. if it's not a simple sequence generator, a BIP on BIPs probably makes more sense.
< rebroad>
MarcoFalke i only just realised that BIP111 didn't get updated with the changes I proposed back in 2016... so yeah, nevermind... i guess i wasn't keeping my eye on the ball back in 2016!
2021-05-01
< hsjoberg>
Yeah thanks, that's what I thought as well, and AFAICT the reason why we even have such high threshold for BIP9
2021-04-28
< sipa>
BIP342 specifically contains a (somewhat unrelated) improvement of introducing "key versions", specifically intended for things like that
< sipa>
depends on whether you mean taproot in reference to the technology to tweak keys as a commitment scheme, or the BIP341/BIP342 proposal
2021-04-25
< luke-jr>
I'm down to 8 tabs of BIPs PRs, one of which is presumably 1104; I don't know how involved the tab(s) before that are to go through
< murch>
Well, some wallets implemented experimental Taproot support before BIP350
< luke-jr>
jeremyrubin: BIPs PRs merging slowly is not a new thing at all.
< luke-jr>
harding: right now, I'm churning through dealing with the rebase of BIP8 on top of the ST stuff. I suppose that might go faster if there were people willing to review it. But frankly then it almost sounds like I'm holding the BIPs hostage, and I don't want to do that either.
< luke-jr>
as a reminder, though, BIPs *are* just documentation, so there really shouldn't need to be a rush
< meshcollider>
jeremyrubin: I interpret that "long winded discussion" bit to be about the BIPs themselves, not the process of adding an editor
< jnewbery>
it does seem somewhat of a centralization problem. The BIPs repo is a venue for sharing proposed changes to Bitcoin, and one person decides who can update it, and also decides whether or not they should ever be replaced/supplemented?
< ariard>
jeremyrubin: on the other point, I don't think bip2 recommend bitcoin-core-dev as a venue, maybe better suitted to #bitcoin or #bitcoin-wizards
< wumpus>
right the role of BIP editors is to follow the BIP1/2 process, not to pass personal judgement on BIPs besides very basic style criteria
< jeremyrubin>
As far as you've represented previously, you haven't had time to even look at the BIP341 changes which is why it's not merged.
< jnewbery>
I suggest that we lighten his load by adding a second BIP editor. BIP2 allows multiple BIP editors and refers to plural BIP editors in several places, eg "The BIP editors are intended to fulfill administrative and editorial responsibilities. The BIP editors monitor BIP changes, and update BIP headers as appropriate."
< bitcoin-git>
bitcoin/master dbc1981 Sebastian Falbesoner: test: check that _all_ invalid-CLTV txs are allowed in a block pre-BIP65
2021-04-20
< ariard>
sipa: i agree, the best you can hope is an economic compatible tx-relay policy widely deployed on the network like bip125
2021-04-16
< aj>
release notes and an update of bips.md ("without mainnet activation") probably should be done before rc1?
< luke-jr>
kallewoof: maybe there should be a new BIP, also eliminating BIP Comments and adding Markdown back into the mix. certain people have decided to skip BIPs because they don't like people leaving comments, and I can only guess the Lightning BOLT stuff is because they prefer markdown…
< luke-jr>
ultimately BIP9 uses starttime to choose a height based on difficulty-period boundaries (2 weeks long)
< luke-jr>
provoostenator: after all, it had plenty of review and was RTM weeks before this BIP9 stuff, and still wasn't merged anyway
< luke-jr>
provoostenator: MarcoFalke already blocked me from doing so; I have no reason to expect decent behaviour from devs strongarming BIP9 back in at this point anyway. Something is clearly going on behind the scenes.
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] fanquake merged pull request #21377: Speedy trial support for versionbits (master...202103-bip9-speedy-trial-support) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21377
2021-04-14
< luke-jr>
or to be more correct, people who don't consider it a triviality, are unanimously in favour of BIP8
< luke-jr>
it's not triviality except to BIP9 advocates
< emzy>
fwiw I was prefering bip8 and ok with bip9 in the beginning. And I think many thought the same at that time.
< jeremyrubin>
Sorry if this is line noise for this channel -- but this is the best job I could do at breaking down the claim that BIP8 has consensus (LOT=?) and ST/MTP does not
< luke-jr>
jeremyrubin: BIP8 doesn't require LOT for ST any more than BIP9 does
< jeremyrubin>
Overall I feel relativelty confident based on this review dismissing the notion that BIP8 has consensus and ST/MTP does not
< jeremyrubin>
Further in support of BIP8's consensus being questionable earlier on, I think harding has had a very good read on the community in general. I don't beleive he would have included BIP9 in his proposal as an option if he thought the community was decisive
< jeremyrubin>
Further, the type of consensus around BIP8 in these meeting logs (maybe it's somewhere else, figure the meetings are more relevant than twitter/reddit) is not super high quality IMO because it's mainly ACK'ing the properties of BIP8 as opposed to the specific implementation
< jeremyrubin>
"but we already agreed to XXX for BIP8" doesn't hold when a keystone component of BIP8 (LOT) is what made ST a thing in the first place.
< jeremyrubin>
so it seems inaccurate to me to label BIP8 as having consensus when a key parameter did not
< jeremyrubin>
I can see why luke-jr and michaelfolkson think there might be consensus on BIP8, but I think they are viewing the process as "gradient descent on a continuos surface" as opposed to a discontinuous process.
< jeremyrubin>
and BIP8 requires *a choice* of that
< jeremyrubin>
(in fact, it's usually preferable to be descriptive otherwise we have useless BIPs clogging the numberspace)
< jeremyrubin>
BIPs are often descriptive
< jeremyrubin>
in fact at this point it probably has more review than any BIP8 anything has ever had
< jeremyrubin>
and you've extrapolated BIP9 RIP ==> MTP cannot be used
< jeremyrubin>
I see people caring about the *properties* of BIP8 vs BIP9, not excluding MTP being used in the future
< jeremyrubin>
reading through http://gnusha.org/taproot-activation/2021-02-02.log, based on which michaelfolkson bases claim that BIP9 is "dead" and therefore MTP can't be used, TBH I just don't see that being the emergent agreement
< luke-jr>
anyway, how things get documented in BIPs is trivial in comparison to the real issues
< jeremyrubin>
luke-jr: community's consensus aroudn BIP8 WHERE
< jeremyrubin>
What test is BIP8 passing that 21377 is not
< luke-jr>
most have never even heard of 21377, and it is opposed to the community's consensus aroudn BIP8
< luke-jr>
ST/BIP8 had (has?) widespread support, not ST/BIP9
< luke-jr>
the community is almost unanimous in favour of BIP8
< jeremyrubin>
Luke, what test is BIP8 passing w.r.t. consensus that ST is not?
< jeremyrubin>
he's consistently failed to answer questions like "what is incompatible with ST" or "what definition of consensus are you using that passes BIP8 and not ST"
< jeremyrubin>
luke-jr can you give a definition for what consensus is? Is there a concrete and consistent definition you are applying that BIP8 LOT=true is satisfying that the current ST MTP start/stop + height of activation minimum is not meeting that can be applied here and in the future?
< jeremyrubin>
What is BIP8 LOT=? satisfying
< jeremyrubin>
Maybe remove BIP8 LOT=true?
< jonatack>
jamesob: achow101: same, i'm still reviewing. did a first pass to get the code and bips in my head, need to do another one
< luke-jr>
sipa: there is agreement on BIP8, yes
< jeremyrubin>
I'll reiterate here: luke-jr luke-jr can you give a definition for what consensus is? Is there a concrete and consistent definition you are applying that BIP8 LOT=true is satisfying that the current ST MTP start/stop + height of activation minimum is not meeting that can be applied here and in the future?
2021-04-12
< sipa>
luke-jr: BIP68 treats it as signed, afaik
2021-04-08
< luke-jr>
anyone involved in the community knows there is consensus around BIP8.
< jeremyrubin>
which says: " The idea can be implemented on top of either Bitcoin Core's existing BIP9 code or its proposed BIP8 patchset.[6]"
< luke-jr>
achow101: I didn't say that, but it's far fewer than the consensus around BIP8
< wumpus>
#topic Attempts to use "dev muscle" to force MTP against community consensus of BIP8 (luke-jr)
< core-meetingbot>
topic: Attempts to use "dev muscle" to force MTP against community consensus of BIP8 (luke-jr)
< wumpus>
one proposed meeting topic: attempts to use "dev muscle" to force MTP against community consensus of BIP8 (luke-jr)
< luke-jr>
#proposedmeetingtopic attempts to use "dev muscle" to force MTP against community consensus of BIP8
< sipa>
amiti: i think that's fair... i also don't really know what the issue would be with a sendaddrtypes message with a bitvector of bip155 network types for example (apart from not wanting to deal with that too right now)
< sipa>
aj: i think ariard is trying to point out that bip37/bip60 only talk about *announcing* transactions, not sending (possibly unannounced) transactions
< ariard>
aj: right but imo current bip60 semantic isn't clear with what the sender is allowed to do
< sipa>
if you're going by reading the spec by the letter... what does bip60"s fRelay flag even mean for a client that chooses not.to implement bip37?
< aj>
ariard: I run a -blocksonly node. You run a bip60 compliant node. I tell you fRelay=false. You don't send me any txes. You told me fRelay=true. Therefore I can send you a tx, without violating bip60.
< ariard>
aj: my point was bip37 original scope was unclear if it concerns only inv(tx) or any tx-related message, bip338 has the merit to clarify
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] luke-jr opened pull request #21399: Genericide BIP9 in variable/type names and comments (master...vbits_rename) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21399
2021-03-08
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] achow101 opened pull request #21392: Implement BIP 8 based Speedy Trial activation (master...bip8-speedy-trial) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21392
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] ajtowns opened pull request #21377: Speedy trial support for versionbits (master...202103-bip9-speedy-trial-support) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21377
2021-03-04
< achow101>
andytoshi: I've pushed the updated tests to my bips pr too
< andytoshi>
achow101: in BIP174, the test vector "PSBT with unknown types in the inputs" describes an input which has keytype 0x0f and key 0102030405060708. this is a valid PSBT
< sipa>
so i guess we could list BIP60 as implemented, actually
< MarcoFalke>
Bitcoin Core implements BIP60, but doesn't require peers to implement it. (Like any other optional BIP)
< luke-jr>
it doesn't require breakign non-BIP60 peers
< sdaftuar>
sipa: but we're compatible with bip60 peers, and i think we now expect our peers to always read our fRelay flag if its' set to false, right?
< ariard>
even the original bip37 is really unclear if fRelay semantic is to disable tx-relay or just tx-announcement
< sipa>
luke-jr: BIP60 is about predictably-sized version messages, not just the fRelay flag
< sipa>
it'd probably not be a bad idea to have bip32 derivation in the test framework
2021-02-26
< michaelfolkson>
"I like a hidden option in Core which is always there from day one, which is lot=true or taproot-bip8-lot-true or something that would change lockinontimeout to true and also change the default user agent string so you can tell people are running it. That’s good because by the time 6 months comes almost everyone has upgraded anyway, they’ve just got to change their config." (From the Sydney Socratic)
< sipa>
you may mean bip147
< shesek>
(NULLDUMMY being validness rather than standardness as of bip62)
< sipa_>
bip62 is not consensus
2021-02-22
< bitcoin-git>
[gui] MarcoFalke merged pull request #206: Display fRelayTxes and bip152_highbandwidth_{to, from} in peer details (master...add-fields-to-peer-details) https://github.com/bitcoin-core/gui/pull/206
2021-02-20
< wumpus>
i think what i need is a way to generate a *derived xpub* for a custom path in the wallet, i can do this with external tooling (e.g. darosior's bip32 python module), but afaik not from bitcoin core itself?
2021-02-17
< jb55>
I don't even think recommending bip39 support to 'newbies' would be a good idea. ideally there would be an easy way to connect a hardware wallet and get descriptors that way vs bip39 on your computer
< sipa>
there are a few things that can be worked on towards supporting that, like descriptor export, getting descriptor wallets in general less experimental, and things like bip39 support in descriptors directly
< sipa>
there is an issue for BIP39 support in descriptors somewhere
2021-02-13
< bitcoin-git>
bitcoin/master b08cbd0 Wladimir J. van der Laan: Merge #21028: doc/bips: Add BIPs 43, 44, 49, and 84
< bitcoin-git>
bitcoin/master c943326 Luke Dashjr: doc/bips: Add BIPs 43, 44, 49, and 84
2021-02-12
< sipa>
well, because multi doesn't exist in bip342 (no OP_CHECKMULTISIG due to not batch verifiable)
2021-02-10
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] danben opened pull request #21144: test: convert feature_bip_sequence.py to use MiniWallet (master...test-feature-bip68-sequence-without-wallet) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21144
2021-02-09
< bioverse>
I have a nano ledger s with some bitcoin. I have the 24 words and wallet in a safe place. I went to https://iancoleman.io/bip39/ using a Ubuntu live from USB. I put the 24 mnemonic words and could not find any bitcoin address ever used. I freaked. I thought. Oh my god! I ordered a second brand new nano ledger s. Put the 24 words, using ledger live in a brand new laptop and my coins were there in the brand new ledger nano s. I am safe. But I have
2021-02-05
< bitcoin-git>
bitcoin/master 3931732 Wladimir J. van der Laan: Merge #20646: doc: refer to BIPs 339/155 in feature negotiation
< bitcoin-git>
bitcoin/master e1e6714 Jon Atack: doc: refer to BIPs 339/155 in feature negotiation
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] laanwj merged pull request #20646: doc: refer to BIPs 339/155 in feature negotiation (master...signet-keep-post-verack-sendaddrv2-peers) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20646
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] jonatack reopened pull request #20646: doc: refer to BIPs 339/155 in feature negotiation (master...signet-keep-post-verack-sendaddrv2-peers) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20646
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] jonatack closed pull request #20646: doc: refer to BIPs 339/155 in feature negotiation (master...signet-keep-post-verack-sendaddrv2-peers) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20646
< dr_orlovsky>
so BIP43-type new purpose value for P2TR will be a good solution in this respect as well?
< sipa>
i guess that means this whole point is moot, and we should probably have a deep look at proving security of ECDSA and Schnorr signatures of linearly related keys (as those created by P2C-tweaking or BIP32 derivation result)
< sipa>
i don't know if that needs a standard like BIP43 - perhaps it helps
< sipa>
yeah, you'll probably want a separate bip32 path for P2TR outputs; but that has nothing to do with ECDSA/Schnorr; you just don't want to reuse the same keys
< nickler>
luke-jr: what are the relevant PRs and issues? The two from aj to the BIP8 and your #19573?
< sdaftuar>
sipa: whether bips are the right place or not is unclear to me, but i think communicating relay policies like this so that 3rd party wallets know what behavior to aim for is helpful. in the case of bip125, my hesitation towards amending or redrafting is that we should fix the implementation in other ways anyway
< sipa>
if there really is a discrepancy between bip125 and what bitcoin core implements, it could be mentioned in doc/bips.md
< pinheadmz>
is BIP125 (RBF) accurate with the implementation? Specifically, is it the absolute fees that are compared between replaces and replacing tx? or the fee rate?
< sdaftuar>
sipa: my understanding as well that there are no BIPs on it
< sipa>
i don't think it's unreasonable to recommend not relaying addresses to disabletx peers; so far addr relay is completely local policy anyway with no BIPs discussing it at all afaik
< jnewbery>
sdaftuar: do you have any further thoughts about what a future addr relay negotiation method would look like? I know you were pushing for something similar with BIP155
< sdaftuar>
but BIP37 allows for transaction relay to resume with a FILTERCLEAR message
< sdaftuar>
but to do all that, we need to give nodes a way to know that an inbound peer is a block-relay-only peer. currently block-relay-only peers use the fRelay flag from BIP37 to instruct their peer they don't want transactions
2021-01-10
< luke-jr>
bips.md?
< sipa>
sdaftuar_: also added a mention of BIP339 in the release notes
2021-01-04
< vasild>
but I failed to verify the callers of the constructor CSubNet(CNetAddr&) which used to create one-host-subnet before and would also "work" for torv2 addresses (in the code before bip155) by matching a single address
< vasild>
jonatack: when I extended CNetAddr to support longer-than-16-bytes addresses (as part of bip155) I also changed CSubNet to only handle ipv4 and ipv6 addresses - because it contains char netmask[16]; it makes no sense to apply it to e.g. 32 byte torv3 address
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] MarcoFalke merged pull request #20189: test: Switch to BIP341's suggested scheme for outputs without script (master...202010_taproot_std_noscript) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20189
< bitcoin-git>
bitcoin/master 812baaa Pieter Wuille: Switch to BIP341's suggested scheme for outputs without script
< bitcoin-git>
bitcoin/master cc592a8 MarcoFalke: Merge #20189: test: Switch to BIP341's suggested scheme for outputs withou...
2020-12-16
< jnewbery>
If you consider BIP37 and optional standard, then it's not really a violation of the protocol to send tx INVs after receiving a version with fRelay = false
< vasild>
eventually, maybe we would update bip155 to mandate the i2p addr size is allowed to be either 32 or 35 bytes
2020-12-14
< bitcoin-git>
bitcoin/master 4b7b58b Jon Atack: Update net_processing WTXID documentation per BIP339
< vasild>
sipa: wumpus: wrt sending sendaddrv2 and the difference between the code and the BIP, I opened https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/1043 to change the BIP.
2020-12-05
< pinheadmz>
re: coordination though - BIPs are good places to pick service bits, etc at the community level - thats not really "bitcoin core deciding:
< pinheadmz>
i see yeah reading up the chatter on bip155 PR as well...
< wumpus>
... even less interest and we might as well puglish BIPs directly into the arctic code vault
< jonasschnelli>
It might lead to more reluctant testing and lesser interest to read BIPs more carefully
< jonasschnelli>
<wumpus> my first public draft was apparently june 1, 2018, I posted it to the mailing list feb 18, 2019 (there we no replies at all), I created the PR for the BIPs repository on feb 27, 2019, it was merged jul 23, 2019. Vasild picked up the implementation april this year, and quite quickly had a working implementation (though some other detailed were still ironed out). [...]
< wumpus>
but it's too frustrating for me personally and I don't think I'll be working on BIPs again
< wumpus>
my first public draft was apparently june 1, 2018, I posted it to the mailing list feb 18, 2019 (there we no replies at all), I created the PR for the BIPs repository on feb 27, 2019, it was merged jul 23, 2019. Vasild picked up the implementation april this year, and quite quickly had a working implementation (though some other detailed were still ironed out). It was discussed in
2020-12-03
< luke-jr>
until we switch to BIP324
< luke-jr>
(we can just add new features only within the context of BIP324)
< luke-jr>
as long as we ensure they can't continue their silliness into BIP324, at least it has an end date?
< jonasschnelli>
BIP324 is probably different since we want to get disconnected when the handshake is not supported
< jonasschnelli>
Its not even messages in BIP324,.. its the handshake that is headerless
< * sipa>
points at BIP324
< luke-jr>
IANA and BIPs aren't that different
< luke-jr>
sdaftuar: we also have no authority to impose BIP155 on them anyway
< sdaftuar>
i am not sure an updated version of bip155 was ever sent to the mailing list describing that the version bump was being dropped. so it's hard to blame them, imo, other than for a long-running misunderstanding of how we think unknown messaegs should be treated
< sdaftuar>
what's the status of sendaddrv2/bip155, there was a report that it caused other peers to disconnect us i think?
2020-12-01
< jnewbery>
vasild: your suggested change to BIP155 isn't what Bitcoin Core is doing. It sends the message after receiving a version message
< vasild>
maybe bip155 should be corrected: "sendaddrv2 SHOULD be sent after receiving the verack message" s/receiving/sending/
< sipa>
i'm happy we got bip154 in 0.21, but this isn't the time to change it anymore...
< jonatack>
michaelfolkson: when reviewing, sometimes running them for less than a minute finds things, e.g. was the case for the BIP324 implementation
< S3RK>
question about fuzzing. we use regtest chain params, but in corups for src/test/fuzz/descriptor_parse.cpp I see xprv keys. As a result fuzzing don't cover code paths with valid keys for bip32 decriptors. I tried to add initial seeds with tprv, but fuzzer doesn't detect any new edges covered. What do I miss?
2020-11-03
< jonasschnelli>
I haven't seen BIP324 discussion about the missing backward secrecy of the current rekeying approach.
< sipa>
as long as we don't worry about secrecy in the other direction (which the current bip324 writeup doesn't, afaik), i think this is very much preferable
< jonasschnelli>
I wanted to ask about BIP324's rekeying
< gribble>
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/18242 | Add BIP324 encrypted p2p transport de-/serializer (only used in tests) by jonasschnelli · Pull Request #18242 · bitcoin/bitcoin · GitHub
< S3RK>
question about fuzzing. we use regtest chain params, but in corups for src/test/fuzz/descriptor_parse.cpp I see xprv keys. As a result fuzzing don't cover code paths with valid keys for bip32 decriptors. I tried to add initial seeds with tprv, but fuzzer doesn't detect any new edges covered. What do I miss?
< sipa>
bip322 proves the ability to spend coins sent to a particular bitcoin address; a lightning equivalent sounds like it would need a lightning-specific solution
2020-10-19
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] sipa opened pull request #20189: Switch to BIP341's suggested scheme for outputs without script (master...202010_taproot_std_noscript) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20189
< sipa>
there is one context where we actually treat someone with a private key as an attacker in BIP340, and it's a rather unusual requirement: nobody (even those with private keys) should be able to construct a signature for which the single-sig validation and batch-validation algorithm produce a different result (with more than negligible probability)
< phantomcircuit>
sipa, yeah i understand now, i was confused by the bip340 language about malleability
< sipa>
phantomcircuit: to be clear, the bip340 signing algorithm is deterministic if no auxiliary randomness is used
< bitcoin-git>
bitcoin/master 79f3d9b Pieter Wuille: Mention BIP155 in doc/bips.md
2020-10-11
< ja>
luke-jr: when would an ack be necessary for marking 'obsolete'? i thought it would be analogous to 'final' which you seem to wait for an explicit ack for here: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/926
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] fanquake merged pull request #19954: Complete the BIP155 implementation and upgrade to TORv3 (master...torv3) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19954
2020-10-10
< ariard>
vasild: I'm still not understanding how a BIP155 node is supposed to discover the list of network IDs supported by its BIP155-peers ?
2020-10-09
< sipa>
(and the usage in bip152 is restricted to 16-bit numbers, which obviously won't have any problems)
2020-10-08
< sipa>
i guess we overlooked that in bip152, where it's also not used as a size, but restricted to pretty small numbers
< sipa>
it is as BIP42 predicted
< jonatack>
to summarize, if I may: before feature freeze in one week, please review 19953 (BIPs 340-342), 19954 (tor v3), 19988 (tx relay logic), and 19077 (sqlite wallet)
2020-10-03
< bitcoin-git>
[bitcoin] robot-dreams opened pull request #20074: test: p2p_blockfilters tests for BIP157 config args (master...bip157-blockfilters-tests) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20074
< wumpus>
the higher level question would be 'should AddrMan be entirely disabled in some cases', we had some related discussion wrt. that for BIP155 for making it possible for nodes to signal that they don't take part in address gossip
< sipa>
wumpus: also, ack bip155 changes, as those need to be stable before 0.21 if we want it :)
< vasild>
I agree it is out of scope, but I also think "I participate in gossip" is out of scope for bip155, if we consider that its purpose is to support larger than 16 byte addresses
< wumpus>
things like that were proposed before, though never in the for of a BIP afaik, but I think that's out of scope of BIP155
< vasild>
Wrt the next bip155/torv3 PR, assuming #19845 gets merged - #19031 has two more commits "net: CAddress & CAddrMan: (un)serialize as ADDRv2" (+193/-15) and "net: advertise support for ADDRv2 via new message" (+129/-8). Then we will have done BIP155 - will gossip torv3/i2p/cjdns addresses if we receive them (even though we may not be able to make use of them yet). After that we need one more change
< sipa>
i wonder how much of a bandwidth savings BIP155 will be
< wumpus>
phantomcircuit: that's not relevant here, we don't do DNS lookups for bitcoin nodes, and in any case, how a DNS returns is separate from how they're gossiped (which is all that BIP155 is about)
< sipa>
BIP155 makes it sound like (a), at least for TORv2
< sipa>
vasild: the way i see it, the P2P is just lagging behind a bit due to no BIP155, but we can easily circumvent that now ;)
< sipa>
BIP155 supports up to 512 bytes addresses, but clients will ignore unknown networks/lengths
2020-09-09
< ariard>
jonasschnelli: just replied on bip324, AFAICT real-or-random and I favor MACing the length a la noise, even if as Lloyd is pointing we don't a concrete exploitation of it
2020-09-08
< yanmaani>
I know, but is there any research being done? Like on BIPs or stuff? I know about utreexo
< sipa>
though they were an essential part of BIP37
< sipa>
aj: i have a branch where it's half done, but i got preempted by bip340/taproot stuff
< jonatack>
quick reminder to review the bip155 and bip324 implementation PRs
< gmaxwell>
https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/558 looks ready-ish to merge, so if anyone wanted to review ack this updated version that reflects the latest BIP340 changes (even R), it's time!